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CLOSING THE GAP:
INTERPRETING FEDERAL RULE OF
EVIDENCE 408 TO EXCLUDE
EVIDENCE OF OFFERS AND
STATEMENTS MADE BY PROSECUTORS
DURING PLEA NEGOTIATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a prosecutor trying a major public corruption case
involving a high profile public official and several other important
business leaders. Attempting to secure more evidence to ensure con-
viction of the major players in the corruption, you extend an offer to a
low-level conspirator to allow her to plead guilty to a lesser offense
and avoid jail time if she will testify at trial against the other conspira-
tors. You also offer another conspirator immunity for her role in the
conspiracy in exchange for her testimony against the others. Both the
conspirators, however, reject your offers. Then, at their subsequent
trials, they seek to introduce into evidence the details of your plea
offers and their rejection of them as evidence in their defense, and
you promptly object that this evidence is inadmissible.
In ruling on your objection, the trial judge likely would consider
Federal Rule of Evidence 410.1 Typically, Rule 410 governs the ad-
Rule 410 states:
Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the following is not, in any
civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who made the plea or
was a participant in the plea discussions:
(1) a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn;
(2) a plea of nolo contendere;
(3) any statement made in the course of any proceedings under Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or comparable state procedure
regarding either of the foregoing pleas; or
(4) any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney
for the prosecuting authority which do not result in a plea of guilty or
which result in a plea of guilty later withdrawn.
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missibility of evidence of an offer to compromise a criminal charge,2
generally referred to as plea bargaining.3 This rule excludes evidence
of untonsummated plea negotiations and statements made in connec-
tion thereto when offered in a criminal or civil case against the defen-
dant who participated in the negotiations.4 Rule 410, however, does
not exclude such evidence when offered by the defendant against the
government in a criminal trial. 5 Accordingly, in the hypothetical de-
scribed above, Rule 410 would not bar the admission of evidence of
the prosecutor's plea and immunity offers when offered as evidence
by the criminal defendants. Indeed, this was the conclusion reached
by a court faced with this question in a similar case.6 The problem
with this result is easy to see. If a defendant may introduce evidence
of a rejected plea or immunity offer in her favor at trial, a prosecutor
may be reluctant to make such an offer.
There is, however, a ready solution to this dilemma. This Note ar-
gues that when a defendant offers evidence of a plea offer or negotia-
tion against the government, courts should consider the admissibility
of such evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 408. 7 Rule 408 gen-
However, such a statement is admissible (i) in any proceeding wherein another
statement made in the course of the same plea or plea discussions has been intro-
duced and the statement ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously with it,
or (ii) in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement if the statement was
made by the defendant under oath, on the record and in the presence of counsel.
FED. R. EviD. 410.
2 See Pamela Bennett Louis, Note, United States v. Mezzanatto: An Unheeded Plea To
Keep the Exclusionary Provisions of Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and Federal Rule of Crimi-
nal Procedure 11(e)(6) Intact, 17 PACE L. REV. 231 (1996); Adam Robison, Comment, Waiver
of Plea Agreement Statements: A Glimmer of Hope To Limit Plea Statement Usage to Impeach-
ment, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 661 (2005).
3 This Note uses the terms "plea bargaining," "plea negotiations," and "plea offers" inter-
changeably to refer to the process by which a prosecutor and criminal defendant attempt to
resolve criminal charges by reaching a negotiated agreement "whereby the defendant pleads
guilty to a lesser offense or to one of multiple charges in exchange for some concession by the
prosecutor." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1190 (8th ed. 2004). Although an offer of immunity is
not included in this definition of plea bargaining, the distinction between the two is not relevant
to this Note's discussion of compromises in criminal cases. For an analysis of the plea bargain-
ing process, see Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Note, Getting to "Guilty": Plea Bargaining as
Negotiation, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115 (1997).
4 FED.R.EvID.410.
5 See FED. R. EVID. 410; see also 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 410.05 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2006) ("Nothing
in the rule bars the defendant from offering these statements in his or her own behalf.").
Rule 410 also does not address the admissibility of evidence of a plea or plea bargain that is
offered as evidence in a subsequent civil trial against someone other than the criminal defendant
who engaged in the plea discussion. See FED. R. EvID. 410.
6 See United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 690-94 (2d Cir. 1990).
7 Rule 408 states:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or of-
fering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempt-
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erally bars evidence of offers or negotiations made in compromising a
claim, as well as any statements made in such negotiations, from be-
ing introduced at trial to prove "liability for or invalidity of' the
claim. 8 Rule 408 is similar to Rule 410 in policy 9 and function.'0
In its current form, however, it is unclear whether Rule 408
excludes evidence of efforts to compromise disputed criminal charges
or, alternatively, whether the rule excludes only evidence of efforts to
compromise disputed civil claims. This Note focuses on the
relationship between Rules 408 and 410 and argues that, with some
limitations,' Rule 408 bars evidence of compromise offers and
negotiations, whether it involves a disputed civil claim or a disputed
criminal charge and whether it is offered as evidence in a civil or
criminal case.
The following chart is helpful in understanding this thesis and il-
lustrating the relationship between Rules 408 and 410 in protecting
offers and statements made in compromise negotiations:
ing to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not
admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of
conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible.
This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable
merely because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations. This rule
also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose,
such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue de-
lay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
FED. R. Evto. 408. [Editors' Note: An amendment to Rule 408 went into effect on December 1,
2006, immediately prior to the publication of this Note. Therefore, references in the text to
Rule 408 refer to the rule that was in force prior to December 1, 2006, and references to the
"proposed amendment" refer to the rule that is currently in force. Other than this grammatical
difference, the change in the rule does not affect the substantive discussion, premise, or thesis of
this Note. See infra Section VI.]
8 Id.
9 See 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5342, at 353 (1980) ("The policy of [Rule 410], then, is the same
as that of Rule 408.").
10 Rule 410 bars evidence of the plea bargaining process, a compromise of a criminal
charge, and Rule 408 bars evidence of compromise and offers to compromise generally.
I See infra Section I.C.
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Context in
which the
evidence is
offered
Context in which compromise
statement or offer was made
Civil Criminal
Box BI
Civil Box A
Box B2
Box DI
Criminal Box C
Box D2
This Note will refer to the different boxes in this chart to clarify
for the reader the types of evidence being discussed. Box A represents
evidence of a civil compromise effort that is offered as evidence in a
civil case, and Box C represents the same evidence when offered in a
criminal case. Box B 1 represents evidence of a criminal compromise
effort that is offered as evidence in a civil case against the defendant
who participated in the plea negotiation, and Box D1 represents the
same when offered in a criminal case. Box B2 represents evidence of
a criminal compromise effort that is offered as evidence in a civil case
against a party other than the defendant in the criminal case, and Box
D2 represents the same when offered in a criminal case.
Rule 408 clearly governs Box A, where evidence of offers or
statements to compromise a civil claim is offered in a civil case.' 2 The
circuits are currently split as to whether Rule 408 governs the admis-
sibility of evidence in Box C, where evidence of offers or statements
to compromise a civil claim is offered in a criminal case, and a pro-
posed amendment to Rule 408 adopts the position that Rule 408 gov-
erns this situation.' 3 Rule 410 clearly governs Boxes BI and Dl,
where evidence of offers or statements to compromise a criminal case
(plea bargaining) is offered in either a civil or criminal case against
"the defendant who made the plea or was a participant in the plea
discussions."' 4 By its own language, however, Rule 410 does not go-
12 See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5306.
13 See infra Section II.
14 FED. R. EvlD. 410.
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vern evidence in Boxes B2 and D2, where evidence of offers or
statements to compromise a criminal case is offered against a party
other than the defendant. This Note argues that in these situations
(Boxes B2 and D2), Rule 408 governs and excludes evidence of com-
promise offers and statements that would be excluded under Rule 410
if offered against the defendant (Boxes B 1 and D1).
Section II of this Note reviews the current split in the circuit courts
of appeals as to whether Rule 408 applies in criminal cases to exclude
evidence of civil compromise offers or statements (Box C) and the
proposed amendment to Rule 408 that addresses the circuit split. Sec-
tion II also examines how the proposed amendment's resolution of
that conflict fails to address whether Rule 408 excludes evidence of
criminal compromise offers or negotiations in either civil or criminal
trials (Boxes B2 and D2). Section III summarizes the prevailing ap-
proach courts use to resolve admissibility questions of evidence of
criminal compromise offers and negotiations that are not covered by
Rule 410 (Boxes B2 and D2) and examines a few of the decisions that
have addressed Rule 408 in this context. Section IV analyzes the pol-
icy reasons supporting the application of Rule 408 to exclude evi-
dence of offers and statements made in plea negotiations that are
offered against a party other than the defendant who participated in
the plea negotiations (Boxes B2 and D2) and outlines the limitations
on the application of Rule 408 to bar such evidence. Finally, Section
V addresses the primary counterarguments to the interpretation of
Rule 408 asserted in this Note.
II. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF CIVIL COMPROMISE
NEGOTIATIONS OFFERED IN CRIMINAL TRIALS AND THE PROPOSED
AMENDMENT TO RULE 408
In 2005, the United States Judicial Conference's Standing Com-
mittee on Rules of Practice and Procedure approved a proposed
amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 40815 that addresses "three
1S The proposed amendment was transmitted to the Supreme Court for approval in No-
vember 2005. Absent contrary congressional action, the amendment will become effective
December 1, 2006. The amendment states:
(a) Prohibited uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible on behalf of any par-
ty, when offered to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of a claim that was
disputed as to validity or amount, or to impeach through a prior inconsistent state-
ment or contradiction:
(1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish-or accepting or offer-
ing or promising to accept-a valuable consideration in compromising or
attempting to compromise the claim; and
(2) conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations regarding the
claim, except when offered in a criminal case and the negotiations related
2007]
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important and longstanding conflicts in the courts about the admissi-
bility of statements and offers made in compromise negotiations."'' 6
One of these "longstanding conflicts" concerns the issue of whether
Rule 408 bars evidence of offers to compromise civil claims when
offered as evidence in a subsequent criminal prosecution (Box C).' 7
Indeed, the circuit courts have split on this issue. The Second, Sixth,
and Seventh Circuits have concluded that Rule 408 does not apply in
the criminal context, while the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have held that
Rule 408 applies in both civil and criminal proceedings.'
8
The first part of this section reviews the decisions of these courts
because the reasoning employed by the Second, Sixth, and Seventh
Circuits underlies a primary objection to interpreting Rule 408 to bar
to a claim by a public office or agency in the exercise of regulatory, in-
vestigative, or enforcement authority.
(b) Permitted uses-This rule does not require exclusion if the evidence is offered
for purposes not prohibited by subdivision (a). Examples of permissible purposes in-
clude proving a witness's bias or prejudice; negating a contention of undue delay;
and proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
Amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 408 at 2-3, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/supctl 105/EV_.Clean.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2006) [hereinafter Proposed Amendment].
[Editors Note: This amendment to Rule 408 was not altered by Congress and went into effect on
December 1, 2006, immediately prior to the publication of this Note. References in the text to
Rule 408 refer to the rule in effect prior to December 1, 2006, and references to the "proposed
amendment" refer to the rule that is currently in force. Other than this grammatical difference,
the change in the rule, however, does not affect the substantive discussion, premise, or thesis of
this Note. See infra Section VI]
16 ADvISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE RULES, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITEE
ON EVIDENCE RULES 2 (2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/comment2005/
EVMayO4.pdf#page=l [hereinafter PRELIMINARY ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT]. The three
conflicts the amendment purports to resolve are: (1) the application of Rule 408 to bar evidence
of civil compromise offers offered as evidence in criminal trials, (2) the admissibility of state-
ments made in compromise negotiations for impeachment purposes, and (3) the ability of a
party to introduce evidence of his or her own statements or offers to compromise. Id. at 2-4.
17 Id. at 2 (discussing proposed amendment to Rule 408 and noting "[c]ourts are in dispute
over whether statements and offers made in compromise negotiations [of civil cases] are admis-
sible in subsequent criminal litigation.").
1S See infra notes 20-43 and accompanying text; see also State v. O'Connor, 119 P.3d 806
(Wash. 2005) (collecting cases). Other circuits have addressed Rule 408 in criminal cases with-
out explicitly deciding whether the Rule does or does not apply in criminal cases. See, e.g.,
United States v. Pendergraft, 297 F.3d 1198 (11th Cir. 2002) (admitting videotape of civil
settlement between co-defendants under Rule 408 to show their cooperation); United States v.
Sayakhom, 186 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting Rule 408 argument under plain error re-
view); United States v. Graham, 91 F.3d 213, 219 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("The subject of [Rule 408]
is the admissibility of evidence (in a civil or criminal case) .... "); United States v. Peed,
714 F.2d 7 (4th Cir. 1983) (rejecting defendant's Rule 408 argument because statements were
not part of a negotiation to resolve a civil dispute). State courts have also split on the issue when
interpreting similar state rules of evidence. Compare, e.g., O'Connor, 119 P.3d 806 (concluding
that the rule does not apply in criminal cases), and State v. Mead, 27 P.3d 1115 (Utah 2001)
(same), with State v. Gano, 988 P.2d 1153 (Haw. 1999) (concluding that the rule applies in
criminal cases).
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evidence of compromises or offers of criminal charges.' 9 The second
part of this section discusses how the proposed amendment to Rule
408 resolves the current split among the circuits but fails to clarify the
rule's application to evidence of compromises of criminal charges
(Boxes B2 and D2).
A. Current Case Law and Circuit Split
1. Circuits Holding Rule 408 Does Not Bar Admission of Evidence of
Civil Compromises in a Subsequent Criminal Trial
In United States v. Gonzalez,20 the Second Circuit opined in dicta
that "the primary policy justification for Rule 408's exclusion in the
civil context does not apply to criminal prosecutions.' In Gonzalez,
the defendant faced wire and mail fraud charges for obtaining two
five million dollar loans from two different banks by forging promis-
22sory notes. At trial, the district court allowed testimony from a bank
attorney that Gonzalez admitted that the note was forged in a meeting
concerning the bank's claims against him and the court admitted into
evidence a Confession of Judgment signed by Gonzalez stating that
he was "personally liable" for the full debt of the note.23 In rejecting
Gonzalez's objection to the admission of this evidence under
Rule 408, the Second Circuit held that the trial court properly admit-
ted the evidence for the purpose of establishing the commission of a
crime, which is a purpose other than that prohibited under Rule 408.24
The court stated that the premise behind Rule 408-that encouraging
settlement of civil claims justifies the rule's exclusion of evidence-
"does not justify exclu[sion] ... in criminal prosecutions... [because
t]he public interest in the disclosure and prosecution of crime is surely
greater than the public interest in the settlement of civil disputes. 25
The Second Circuit reaffirmed this analysis twelve years later in
Manko v. United States.26 In a criminal trial regarding allegedly im-
proper tax deductions, the trial court in Manko barred the defendant
under Rule 408 from introducing evidence of a prior civil settlement
with the IRS as an admission by the IRS that certain deductions were
partially justified.27 The Second Circuit reversed and reaffirmed Gon-
19 See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
20 748 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1984).
21 Id. at 78.
22 Id. at 75-76.
23 Id. at 77.
24 Id. at 78.
2 Id.
26 87 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1996).
27 Id. at 52.
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zalez, holding that Rule 408 does not apply in criminal cases because
of "the need for accurate determinations in criminal cases where the
stakes are higher.,
28
In United States v. Prewitt,29 the Seventh Circuit followed the Sec-
ond Circuit's reasoning and held that Rule 408 is inapplicable in
criminal cases. In Prewitt, the defendant appealed his conviction for
mail fraud arguing that the trial court violated Rule 408 by admitting
testimony from an investigator from the Securities Division of the
Indiana Secretary of State who had engaged in settlement negotiations
with the defendant. 30 The Seventh Circuit, in affirming the conviction,
noted that "[tihe clear reading of [Rule 408] suggests that it should
apply only to civil proceedings," and relied on the Second Circuit's
rationale in holding that "Rule 408 should not be applied to criminal
cases."
31
The Sixth Circuit followed the Second and Seventh Circuits' rea-
soning. In United States v. Logan,32 the court rejected the defendants'
appeal under Rule 408 and affirmed the trial court's admission of the
prosecution's evidence of a settlement agreement that resolved an
administrative action against the defendants.33 The court held that the
"plain language of Rule 408 makes it inapplicable in the criminal
context" and found that the risk of "a chilling effect on administrative
or civil settlement negotiations [resulting from its holding in the case]
... is heavily outweighed by the public interest in prosecuting crimi-
nal matters. 34
2. Circuits Holding Rule 408 Applies in Criminal Cases to Bar Evi-
dence of Compromise Offers or Statements Made in Prior Civ-
il Claims
In contrast to the conclusions reached by the Second, Sixth, and
Seventh Circuits, the Fifth Circuit has applied Rule 408 in criminal
cases with little or no discussion of the policy behind the rule or ex-
amination of whether it should apply in the criminal context. In Unit-
ed States v. Meadows,35 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's
admission of the defendant's statements over the defendant's objec-
tion based on Rule 408. In holding there was no violation of the Rule,
28 Id. at 54.
29 34 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 1994).
30 Id. at 439.
31 Id.
32 250 F.3d 350 (6th Cir. 2001).
33 Id. at 367.
34 Id.
35 598 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1979).
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the court assumed that Rule 408 applied in the case "to govern the
admission of related civil settlement negotiations in a criminal trial. ' 36
Similarly, in United States v. Hays,37 the Fifth Circuit directly ap-
plied Rule 408 without raising or addressing the question of whether
the rule applies in criminal cases. In a criminal trial for conspiracy,
the trial court admitted evidence of a civil settlement agreement of-
fered by the government to "assist[] the jury in its understanding of
the breadth of the conspiracy. 38 In reversing the trial court's admis-
sion of the evidence, the Fifth Circuit held that the government's pur-
pose for introducing the evidence of the civil settlement "stands at
direct odds with the clear mandates of Rule 408." 39
In United States v. Bailey,4° the Tenth Circuit faced the issue as a
question of first impression. In a criminal trial stemming from the
defendant's illegal transfer and misappropriation of funds from an
investment partnership he managed, the government introduced
evidence of the defendant's civil settlement with his partners, which
resolved the civil claims against him for his misconduct.41 After
conducting a comprehensive review of the issue, the court rejected the
Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits' "plain language" interpretation,
noting that "nothing in the language of the Rule explicitly excludes
its application to criminal proceedings, ' ' 2 and concluded that
Rule 408 does "bar settlement evidence in both criminal and civil
proceedings.
43
B. Resolution of the Circuit Split by the Proposed Amendment to
Rule 408
As the cases above demonstrate, most courts simply frame the is-
sue before them in terms of whether Rule 408 applies in the criminal
context.44 This generalization, however, "confuse[s] two related but
distinct questions. ''4 First, whether Rule 408 applies in criminal cases
to bar evidence of offers and statements made in an effort to com-
36 Id. at 989.
37 872 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1989).
38 Id. at 589.
39 Id.
- 327 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2003).
41 Id. at 1135-37.
42 Id. at 1145-46.
43 Id. at 1146.
4 See, e.g., United States v. Logan, 250 F.3d 350, 367 (6th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he plain lan-
guage of Rule 408 makes it inapplicable in the criminal context."); Manko v. United States,
87 F.3d 50, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[T]he underlying policy considerations of Rule 408 are
inapplicable in criminal cases.").
45 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5308, at 115 (Supp. 2006).
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promise civil claims (Box C). And second, whether Rule 408 applies
in a criminal or civil case to bar evidence of offers and statements
made during plea bargaining in an effort to compromise criminal
charges (Boxes B and D).46 The foregoing cases address only the first
question in ruling on the admissibility of civil compromises in crimi-
nal trials. 47 The Advisory Committee sought to resolve this issue in
the proposed amendment to Rule 408.48
Initially, the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules drafted the
proposed amendment to adopt the view taken by the Second, Sixth,
and Seventh Circuits.49 In response to public criticism of this posi-
tion,5° the Committee changed the proposed amendment to its current
form:5
(a) Prohibited uses. Evidence of the following is not admissi-
ble on behalf of any party, when offered to prove liability for,
invalidity of, or amount of a claim that was disputed as to va-
lidity or amount, or to impeach through a prior inconsistent
statement or contradiction:
(1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish or
accepting or offering or promising to accept a valu-
able consideration in compromising or attempting to
compromise the claim; and
(2) conduct or statements made in compromise nego-
tiations regarding the claim, except when offered in a
criminal case and the negotiations related to a claim
by a public office or agency in the exercise of regula-
tory, investigative or enforcement authority.
46 Id.
47 See supra notes 20-43 and accompanying text.
48 See PRELIMINARY ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 16, at 2-3.
49 See id. at 2 (noting the proposed amendment was drafted in deference to the Justice De-
partment so that it would not bar admissions of fault in a subsequent criminal case). The Com-
mittee Note to the originally proposed amendment to Rule 408, drafted before public comment,
stated that "the amendment clarifies that Rule 408 does not protect against the use of statements
and conduct during civil settlement negotiations when offered in a criminal case." Id. at 12.
50 See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE RULES, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY
COMMrIrEE ON EVIDENCE RULES 11-17 (2005), reprinted in REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE COMMrITrEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE app. E, at 17-27, available
at http:/www.uscourts.gov/nules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf#page=305 [hereinafter FINAL ADVISORY
COMMrrTEE REPORT] (summarizing public comments).
51 See id. at 11 ("In response to public comment, the proposed amendment was changed to
provide that statements and conduct during settlement negotiations are to be admissible in
subsequent criminal litigation only when made during settlement discussions of a claim brought
by a government regulatory agency.").
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(b) Permitted uses. This rule does not require exclusion if the
evidence is offered for purposes not prohibited by subdivi-
sion (a). Examples of permissible purposes include proving a
witness's bias or prejudice; negating a contention of undue
delay; and proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investiga-
52tion or prosecution.
The amended rule excludes offers and statements in civil compromise
negotiations when offered in subsequent criminal cases, except when
the "negotiations relate[] to a claim by a public office or agency in the
exercise of regulatory, investigative, Or enforcement authority. '53 The
Committee thus implicitly adopted the conclusions of the Fifth and
Tenth Circuits-that Rule 408 applies in criminal cases-but added
an exception for compromise negotiations concerning civil claims
with the government.54
While clarifying this first question, however, the proposed
amendment ignores the second question-whether Rule 408 excludes
those statements and offers made during plea bargaining in an effort
to compromise a criminal charge. Like the current rule, the proposed
amendment to Rule 408 is silent as to whether Rule 408 excludes
evidence of compromise offers and negotiations regarding only civil
claims or whether the rule also covers such offers and negotiations
regarding criminal charges as well.55 Had the amendment adopted the
view that Rule 408 never applies in the criminal context as initially
proposed, it would be clear that Rule 408 would not bar evidence of
compromises of disputed criminal charges when offered in criminal
trials.
Instead, by generally allowing Rule 408's exclusion to apply in
criminal cases, the proposed amendment complicates but fails to an-
swer the second question. As noted above, the proposed amendment
does not bar evidence of "conduct or statements made in compromise
negotiations . . . when offered in a criminal case and the negotiations
related to a claim by a public office or agency in the exercise of regu-
latory, investigative, or enforcement authority. 56 This exception
seems to apply to the second question-whether Rule 408 excludes
those statements and offers made during plea bargaining in an effort
to compromise a criminal charge-as it arguably covers plea negotia-
52 Proposed Amendment, supra note 15.
53 Id.
54 See FINAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 50, at 7.
55 See Proposed Amendment, supra note 15; 3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 134, at 81 (noting that Rule 408 is silent concerning
application to criminal charges).
56 Proposed Amendment, supra note 15.
20071
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
tions as they relate to a claim (the criminal charge) by a public office
(the United States Attorney's Office) in the exercise of enforcement
authority. While this may be a reasonable interpretation of the lan-
guage of the proposed amendment, the Committee did not believe it
was addressing this question in adopting the amendment. Discussing
this exception, the Advisory Committee's note to the proposed
amendment states that the rule does not bar in a criminal case evi-
dence of "statements or conduct during compromise negotiations re-
garding a civil dispute by a government regulatory, investigative, or
enforcement agency., 57 Therefore, if the exception in the proposed
amendment applies to the plea negotiation context, this result was
unintended by the Rule's drafters.
Regardless of whether the proposed amendment's exception in
part (a)(2) applies to the plea bargaining process, the proposed
amendment still does not fully resolve the question of whether
Rule 408 applies in a criminal or civil case to bar evidence of offers
and statements made during plea bargaining (Boxes B and D). The
proposed amendment fails to answer this question for two reasons.
First, the amendment's exception to the prohibition of Rule 408 does
not extend to part (a)(1) of the proposed rule.58 Because the exception
would not apply to evidence of an offer or promise to compromise a
criminal charge made during the plea bargaining process, Rule 408
could still exclude such evidence. Second, by its language, the excep-
tion does not apply to evidence offered in a civil trial. Thus, the ex-
ception to the exclusion of Rule 408 would not apply to evidence of
conduct or statements made in the plea bargaining process if offered
in a civil trial against a party other than the defendant (Box B2) 59 who
participated in the plea bargaining, and this evidence could be barred
by Rule 408.60 Therefore, despite any unintended effects of the pro-
posed amendment's exception, the amendment ultimately fails to ad-
dress or resolve the issue of whether Rule 408 excludes evidence of
compromise statements or offers made in compromising criminal
claims.
57 See FINAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 50, at 7 (emphasis added).
58 Proposed Amendment, supra note 15.
59 Rule 410 bars evidence of conduct or statements made in the plea bargaining process if
offered against the defendant who participated in the plea bargaining. FED. R. EvtD. 410.
60 This illustrates another unintended consequence of the proposed amendment. The ex-
ception of part (a)(2) in the amendment to Rule 408 indicates that the Rule does not require an
identity between the legal "claims" referred to in Rule 408. Proposed Amendment, supra
note 15. The exception makes no sense if the Rule's prohibition applies only if there is a legal
identity of the legal "claim" being compromised and the "claim" in which the evidence is of-
fered, even though a plain reading of the current language of Rule 408 seems to indicate an
opposite conclusion.
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III. CURRENT CASE LAW ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF OFFERS AND
STATEMENTS IN COMPROMISE OF CRIMINAL CLAIMS
When faced with the issue, most courts do not analyze the admis-
sibility of evidence of offers or statements made in compromising
disputed criminal claims, not otherwise barred by Rule 410, under
Rule 408. This perhaps is one reason why the proposed amendment
does not address the issue. This section reviews the case law address-
ing the admissibility of such evidence and the typical analysis courts
employ in resolving the issue.
United States v. Biaggi6' is perhaps the leading case on the issue.
In Biaggi, the district court barred one of the defendants in a public
corruption trial from introducing evidence at trial that he had rejected
the government's offer of immunity from the current charges in ex-
change for information regarding the illegal acts of others.62 The de-
fendant asserted that the evidence of the immunity negotiations was
admissible to prove his "consciousness of innocence"-that he was
unaware of the criminal acts occurring around him.63 The Second
Circuit rejected the government's argument that the evidence of im-
munity negotiation should be barred just as evidence of plea negotia-
tions is barred under Rule 410. The court highlighted the fact that
Rule 410's exclusion of evidence of plea negotiations "against the
defendant ' 64 "does not necessarily [mean] that the Government is
entitled to a similar shield. 65 Instead, the court weighed the admissi-
bility of the evidence of the rejected immunity offer under Federal
Rules of Evidence 401,66 40267 and 403.68 The court declined to de-
cide whether a rejected plea bargain is admissible as evidence of a
defendant's "consciousness of innocence," but it stated that evidence
of a rejected immunity offer "is probative of a state of mind devoid of
guilty knowledge, 6 9 and thus is relevant under Rule 401.7° The court
61 909 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1990).
62 id. at 690.
63 Id.
64 Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 1 l(e)(6); FED. R. EvID. 410).
65 Id.
66 Rule 401 states: "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401.
67 Rule 402 states: "All relevant evidence is admissible .... Evidence which is not rele-
vant is not admissible." FED. R. EvID. 402.
68 Rule 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mislead-
ing the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403.
69 Biaggi, 909 F.2d at 690.
70 Id. at 691.
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noted that the question of whether the evidence should have been
excluded under Rule 403 because of the "danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion, or delay" was "closer"'7 but concluded that the trial court
erred in excluding the evidence.72
The Fifth Circuit also employed the same analysis in resolving
similar evidentiary questions. In United States v. Maloof,73 the defen-
dant offered evidence that he rejected two offers of immunity. The
court held:
We conclude that the trial court correctly applied Fed. R.
Evid. 401, 410 and 403 as interpreted in Biaggi by allowing
[the defendant] to testify to the sum and substance of the
offers and rejections of immunity; and did not abuse its
discretion under Fed. R. Evid. 403 to bar embellishing details
on the grounds that their probative value was outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, or delay.74
This decision represents the way most courts handle the admissi-
bility of evidence of plea or immunity offers and statements made by
the government in discussing such offers.75 Evidence of compromise
offers or negotiations in the criminal context that are not covered by
Rule 410 are typically admitted or excluded based upon the court's
considerations of the relevance of the evidence under Rules 401 and
402 and the probative value of the evidence balanced by its risk of
prejudice, confusion, or delay under Rule 403.
A few courts, however, have addressed the applicability of
Rule 408 in this context. In United States v. Baker,7 the defendant
attempted to exclude statements he made about making a "deal" to
FBI agents who seized stolen goods in his possession.77 The Second
Circuit held that it is "fairly evident" that Rule 408 "applies only to
civil litigation" because the language of Rule 40878 "does not easily
71 Id.
72 Id. In United States v. Samaria, 239 F.3d 228 (2d Cir. 2001), the Second Circuit was
faced with the question it declined to rule on in Biaggi: whether the defendant's rejection of a
plea bargain is admissible in his defense. Although the court again declined to rule on the issue,
it reaffirmed Biaggi's analysis that the admissibility of the evidence involves "the issue of
relevance, under [Rule] 401, and balancing, under [Rule] 403." Id. at 242.
7 205 F.3d 819 (5th Cir. 2000).
74 Id. at 825.
7 See, e.g., United States v. Fell, 372 F. Supp. 2d 773 (D. Vt. 2005); Wiggins v. Cor-
coran, 164 F. Supp. 2d 538 (D. Md. 2001), rev'd on other grounds, 288 F.3d 629 (4th Cir.
2002), rev'd on other grounds, 539 U.S. 510 (2002).
76 926 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1991).
" Id. at 180.
78 Specifically the court referred to the language, "a claim which was disputed as to either
validity or amount." Id. (quoting FED. R. EviD. 408).
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embrace an attempt to bargain over criminal charges" and the exis-
tence of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6), which is identi-
cal to Rule 410, further shows that Rule 408 applies only to civil
cases.
79
Similarly, in United States v. Graham,80 when the defendant at-
tempted to exclude statements made during his post-conviction bar-
gaining with the government, the District of Columbia Circuit Court
held that Rule 408 "does not address the admissibility of evidence
concerning negotiations to 'compromise' a criminal case."'', The
court stated, "[i]n the context of a criminal case, Rule 410 (rather than
Rule 408) strikes the balance between the interest in admitting all
relevant evidence, [under] Rule 402, and the interest in resolving dis-
putes without litigation. 8 2
While most courts reject Rule 408's application to bar evidence of
compromises in a criminal case, as in Baker and Graham, or simply
do not address Rule 408 in this context at all, as in Biaggi and Ma-
loof, the Eighth Circuit has accepted the application of Rule 408 in
this context. In United States v. Verdoorn,8 3 the defendants sought to
introduce evidence of the government's plea offer, which included a
reduction in charges or lighter sentencing offered in exchange for
their testimony against co-defendants. 84 Noting the important policy
considerations favoring plea bargains, the court held that "[u]nder the
rationale of [Rule] 408, which relates to the general inadmissibility of
compromises and offers to compromise, government proposals con-
cerning pleas should be excludable." 85 Moreover, in United States v.
Greene,86 the court extended its holding in Verdoorn to conclude that
Rule 408 bars the admission of evidence that a defendant rejected an
offer of immunity. The court declined to follow Biaggi and held that
evidence of a rejected immunity offer is inadmissible under Rule 408
because there is no "relevant distinction between plea agreements and
immunity agreements .... 8 7
Although the Eighth Circuit rejected Biaggi and applied Rule 408
to exclude offers and statements made in the compromise of criminal
charges, it is the only circuit that has done so.88 Thus, the circuits are
9 Id.
- 91 F.3d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
81 Id. at 218.
8 Id. at 219.
83 528 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1976).
84 Id. at 107.
85 Id
8 995 F.2d 793 (8th Cir. 1993).
7 Id. at 798.
9 But cf United States v. Kemp, 362 F. Supp. 2d 591, 594 (E.D. Pa. 2005) ("[The Third
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split as to whether Rule 408 applies to exclude evidence of efforts to
compromise a criminal claim that occurs in the plea bargaining proc-
ess when offered against the government (Boxes B2 and D2). Most
courts, however, simply have not addressed the issue. Instead, they
judge the admissibility of evidence of plea or immunity offers and
other compromise efforts of criminal cases under Rules 401, 403, or
410.89 This is an unsatisfactory way of dealing with this issue, and
strong policy reasons support the application of Rule 408 to bar evi-
dence of compromises and settlements of disputed criminal charges.
IV. JUSTIFICATION TO EXTEND RULE 408 TO EXCLUDE COMPROMISE
OFFERS AND NEGOTIATIONS MADE IN AN EFFORT TO RESOLVE
CRIMINAL CHARGES
Rule 410's exclusion of evidence of pleas and plea negotiations
rests upon policy considerations intended to promote plea bargaining
by preventing evidence of plea discussions and negotiations from
being introduced at trial.90 The rule's exclusion, however, is limited to
evidence offered "against the defendant." 9' This bars a defendant's
statements made during the plea bargaining process with the prosecu-
tor from being later admitted against him at trial, but the rule provides
no similar protection for the prosecutor. 92 Accordingly, some com-
mentators have noted that Rule 408 could be used by the prosecutor
in this context to "close the gap" of protection that exists in Rule 410
and exclude evidence of plea offers or negotiations offered against the
government. 93 This section further advances this argument by show-
ing that the similar policy considerations behind Rules 408 and 410
justify this interpretation of Rule 408. This section also shows why, in
consideration of these policy justifications, Rule 403 offers a prosecu-
tor insufficient protection against admission of this evidence. Finally,
Circuit has not adopted, and will not adopt, the holding in United States v. Biaggi ... ").
89 Because most courts analyze the admissibility of such evidence under Rules 401 and
403, ignoring the potential application of Rule 408, the divergence between the circuits on this
issue has not been as pronounced as the split between the circuits reviewed in the preceding
section regarding the application of Rule 408 to bar evidence of civil compromise offers and
settlements in criminal trials. This further explains why the Advisory Committee fails to address
this conflict and issue in the proposed amendment to Rule 408.
90 See FED. R. EviD. 410 advisory committee's note.
91 FED. R. EvID. 410.
92 See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 55, § 143, at 139-40; PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN,
PRACTICE COMMENTS, RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND
MAGISTRATES 110-11 (1977); WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5348, at 402-03.
93 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 55, § 134, at 81; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 92.
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this section notes three limitations on the application of Rule 408 to
exclude evidence of compromises in the criminal context.
A. Policy Favoring Application of Rule 408 to Compromises of
Criminal Cases
Plea bargaining plays an important and essential role in our crimi-
nal justice system.94 In 2003, guilty and no-contest pleas accounted
for ninety-six percent of all convictions and eighty-five percent of all
dispositions of criminal cases filed in district courts.95 The Supreme
Court has noted that "[i]f every criminal charge were subjected to a
full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to
multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities. 96
Indeed, in 1990, a study found that a five percent decrease in the
number of federal cases resolved by guilty pleas would result in a
thirty-three percent increase in the number of trials.97
Even the Supreme Court has noted the importance of plea bargain-
ing in our justice system and the policy considerations supporting it:
The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between
the prosecutor and the accused, sometimes loosely called
"plea bargaining," is an essential component of the
administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be
encouraged....
Disposition of charges after plea discussions is not only an
essential part of the process but a highly desirable part for
many reasons.
98
The Supreme Court enumerated four benefits plea bargaining
achieves: (1) faster resolution of criminal cases; (2) a reduction of
lengthy pre-trial detentions of criminal defendants; (3) increased pro-
tection of the public by limiting the time that dangerous criminal de-
94 See Nancy Amoury Combs, Copping a Plea to Genocide: The Plea Bargaining of In-
ternational Crimes, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 8 (2002) ("Plea bargaining constitutes a vital feature
of the American criminal justice system ...."); George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph,
109 YALE L.J. 857, 860 (2000) ("[P]lea bargaining has so fast a grip on our institutions of
justice that antagonistic institutions cannot survive."); Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bar-
gaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1121, 1122 (1998) (accepting plea bargaining as a given in
our criminal justice system).
95 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 59, 62 tbl. 4.2 (2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/pub/pdf/
cfjs03O4.pdf.
96 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
97 W. John Moore, Courting Disaster, 22 NAT'L J. 502, 505 (1990) (exploring the impact
of the Speedy Trial Act on an overworked court system).
98 Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260-61.
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fendants spend on pre-trial release; and (4) an improved chance that
defendants will be rehabilitated by incarceration. 99
Moreover, Rule 410 itself solidifies the importance of plea bar-
gaining in our system of justice. The Advisory Committee's note to
the first draft of the rule clearly states the policy rationale behind the
exclusion of Rule 410: "Exclusion of offers to plead guilty rests upon
. . . [the] promotion of disposition of criminal cases by compro-
mise. ' 1°° The Advisory Committee, quoting a prominent commenta-
tor, further noted that "[e]ffective criminal law administration in
many localities would hardly be possible if a large proportion of the
charges were not disposed of by such compromises." 10 1 Congress also
approved of the policy considerations behind Rule 410, noting,
"[s]uch a rule is clearly justified as a means of encouraging plead-
ing. ' ' Thus, the policy behind Rule 410 embodies a congressional
intent to encourage the use and improve the effectiveness of the plea
bargaining process to resolve criminal cases through compromise.10 3
In light of the importance of plea bargaining in our justice system
and the strong policy favoring it, if the process is to be protected, it is
essential that statements and offers made during the plea bargaining
process not be admitted as evidence against the maker of the state-
ments or offers. 04 As the Eighth Circuit stated, "[i]f such a policy [of
plea bargaining] is to be fostered, it is essential that plea negotiations
remain confidential to the parties if they are unsuccessful."'' 0 5
Rule 410 does not fully provide this confidentiality to the plea bar-
gaining process, however, because the rule's exclusion, limited to
evidence offered "against the defendant,"' 1 6 leaves a gap in the pro-
tection provided by the rule. This gap is problematic because
"[m]eaningful dialogue between the parties [participating in plea dis-
cussions] would, as a practical matter, be impossible if either party
99 Id. at 261.
100 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts
and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161,241 (1969) (advisory committee's note to Proposed Rule 4-10).
101 Id. (quoting CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 251, at
543 (1954)).
102 FED. R. EvD. 410 Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, reprinted in FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE, S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 10-11 (1974).
103See 2 WEINSTEIN AND BERGER, supra note 5, § 410.03(2) ("Rule 410's exclusion...
represents a substantive policy to promote the disposition of criminal cases by compromise.").
104 See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 266, at 237 (Kenneth S. Broun et al. eds., 6th ed.
2006) ("Public policy accordingly encourages compromise [involved in plea bargaining], and as
in civil cases, that policy is furthered by protecting from disclosure at trial not only the offer but
also statements made during negotiations.").
105 United States v. Verdoom, 528 F.2d 103, 107 (8th Cir. 1975).
06 FED. R. EviD. 410.
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had to assume the risk that plea offers would be admissible in evi-
dence."
107
Accordingly, Rule 408 is needed to supplement Rule 410 to fully
protect and encourage plea bargaining. Rule 408 properly provides
this protection as it is based on extrinsic policy considerations, similar
to Rule 410, of encouraging compromise negotiations.10 8 While the
Advisory Committee noted that one basis for the rule's exclusion of
evidence of offers or statements made in compromise, is that such
evidence may be irrelevant, it further stated "[a] more consistently
impressive ground is promotion of the public policy favoring the
compromise and settlement of disputes."' 9 Congress also noted that
"[t]he purpose of this rule is to encourage settlements which would be
discouraged if such evidence were admissible."' 10
Thus, the policy considerations underlying Rule 408 are similar to
those of Rule 410. Rule 408 "rests upon the strong social policy of
encouraging private resolution of disputes.""' Rule 408, like
Rule 410, is designed to foster the settlement of disputes, in part,
because of the judicial system's need to resolve cases before trial." 2
While Rule 410 is founded on the public interest in fostering
compromise negotiations of criminal charges or plea bargaining,
Rule 408 is founded upon the public interest fostering compromise
negotiations generally." 13 Thus, as noted by other commentators,
"[t]he policy of... [Rule 410], then, is the same as that of
Rule 408."' 1 4 Indeed, even the original Advisory Committee's note
for proposed Rule 410, then Rule 4-10, stated: "As with compromise
offers generally, Rule 4-08, free communication is needed, and
security against having an offer of compromise admitted in evidence
effectively encourages it." 115 Thus, given the similar policy goals, it is
107 Verdoorn, 528 F.2d at 107.
108 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra liote 55, § 134, at 80.
"09 FED. R. EvlD. 408 advisory committee's note (citing MCCORMICK, supra note 104, at
§§ 76, 251).
110 FED. R. Ev1D. 408 Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, reprinted in FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE, S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 10 (1974)).
11 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 55, § 135, at 86.
12 See Todd W. Blanche, Note, When Two Worlds Collide: Examining the Second Cir-
cuit's Reasoning in Admitting Evidence of Civil Settlements in Criminal Trials, 67 BROOK. L.
REV. 527, 532 (2001) ("Although most cases today are resolved in some way other than a trial,
the American judicial system is still clogged with both civil and criminal cases. So the judicial
system has a practical reason for doing everything possible to encourage parties to settle.").
13 See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 55, § 134, at 80; 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM,
supra note 9, § 5307, at 222-24.
114 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5342, at 353.
115 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts
and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 241-42 (1969) (advisory committee's note to Proposed
Rule 4-10).
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appropriate to apply Rule 408 to fill the gap left open by Rule 410
and bar evidence of plea offers or statements not covered by
Rule 410.
Moreover, the language of Rule 408 does not preclude the applica-
tion of Rule 408 in this context. Nothing in the plain language of
Rule 408 is inconsistent with an interpretation of the rule that would
provide additional protection to the plea bargaining process. 16 There-
fore, considering the important role plea bargaining has in our crimi-
nal justice system and the similar policy considerations behind Rules
410 and 408, it is easy to see why courts should "close the gap" of
protection for plea negotiations in Rule 410 by applying Rule 408 to
exclude offers or statements made in plea negotiations when offered
against the government. "
7
B. Problems with Applying Rule 403 Instead of Rule 408 to Exclude
Evidence of Plea Offers and Negotiations Not Governed by Rule 410
Some commentators might argue that the interpretation of
Rule 408 suggested above is unnecessary because Rule 403 may
exclude evidence of plea offers and negotiations not excluded under
Rule 410. A reconsideration of Biaggi, however, reveals the
inadequacy of Rule 403 to further the public policy favoring plea
negotiations.
In Biaggi, the court properly rejected the government's argument
that Rule 410 excludes the evidence of its immunity offer because
Rule 410 clearly prohibits the admission of evidence only when it is
offered "against the defendant."' 18 Then, applying Rules 401 and 403,
the court admitted the immunity offer to show the "consciousness of
innocence" of the defendant.19 The balancing analysis employed by
the court under Rule 403, however, fails to account for the strong
public policy supporting plea negotiations. 20 Rule 403 provides a
trial judge with discretionary power to admit or exclude evidence
based on a balancing of the considerations listed in the rule.' 2' These
16 See infra notes 140-52 and accompanying text. Even the heading of Rule 408, "Com-
promise and Offers to Compromise," fits squarely with the hallmarks of the plea bargaining
process. FED. R. EVID. 408; see also Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 3 (analyzing the plea bar-
gaining process).
11
7 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 55, § 134, at 81.
118 United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 690 (2d Cir. 1990).
119 Id. at 690-92.
120 See supra Section W.A.
121 See 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5212 (noting the discretionary nature of
Rule 403). Rule 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
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considerations, however, do not take into account the public policy
favoring plea bargaining.
The balancing nature of Rule 403 promotes the truth-finding proc-
ess of the courts. 122 In contrast, evidence rules that are based upon
extrinsic policy considerations, such as Rules 408 and 410, sacrifice
the truth-finding process in favor of promoting the social policies that
underlie these rules. 23 Thus, the decision to admit or exclude evi-
dence under the balancing test of Rule 403 fails to account for the
important public policy considerations embodied in Rules 408 and
410, which protect both general efforts to compromise disputes out of
court and efforts to plea bargain.
Due to the differences in the nature of these exclusionary rules, it
is clear that the application of Rule 403 might inhibit plea negotia-
tions. In Biaggi, Rule 403 did not exclude evidence of compromise
efforts undertaken by a prosecutor in a criminal case. 124 It is easy to
see how the inclusion of such evidence would "chill" the plea bar-
gaining process by curbing a prosecutor's desire to offer immunity or
plea bargains that might lead a jury to conclude the defendant did not
commit one of the crimes charged or any crime at all. Just as in a civil
case, "[i]t does not tax the imagination to envision the juror who re-
tires to deliberate with the notion that if the defendants had done
nothing wrong, they would not have paid the money back," 125 so too
in a criminal case, it is easy to envision a juror who retires to deliber-
ate with the notion that if the defendant had committed the crime, the
prosecutor would not have offered immunity or such a favorable plea
bargain. This result demonstrates the inadequacies of Rule 403 to
protect the public policy favoring plea negotiations.
of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EviD. 403.
122 See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkehied, The Meaning of Probative Value and Prejudice in
Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used To Resurrect the Common Law of Evi-
dence?, 41 VAND. L. REV. 879, 894 (1988) (describing Rule 403 as "calculated to facilitate
accurate fact-finding and the search for truth."); Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disre-
garding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1252 (2005) (noting Rule 403 is an example of an "'intrinsic
exclusionary rule[]' [that] exclude[s] relevant information on the ground that its omission will
promote accurate fact finding.").
123 See Wistrich, Guthrie & Rachlinski, supra note 122, at 1252.
124 Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662.
125 United States v. Hays, 872 F.2d 582, 589 (5th Cir. 1989).
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C. Limitations on Applying Rule 408 to Compromises of
Criminal Cases
Applying Rule 408 to bar evidence of compromise efforts in crim-
inal cases furthers the policies behind Rules 408 and 410. Such an
interpretation of Rule 408, however, must come with three limita-
tions. First, Rule 408's exclusion of evidence of plea offers or nego-
tiations must obviously yield to admit evidence when an exclusion
would raise constitutional issues. Consider a plea discussion in which
a corrupt prosecutor, in order to coerce a defendant into accepting a
plea offer, informs the defendant that she intends to use perjured tes-
timony as her primary evidence to obtain a conviction at trial. Despite
the fact that the evidence of this exchange could be excluded by
Rule 408 under the interpretation asserted above, such evidence
should be admissible under constitutional considerations that super-
sede the application of evidentiary rules.
26
Second, Rule 408 should exclude evidence of compromise offers
and negotiations in a criminal case only when such evidence is of-
fered against a party other than the defendant who participated in the
plea negotiations (Boxes B2 and D2). Rule 410 explicitly covers such
evidence offered "against the defendant" (Boxes B1 and Dl),'127 and
interpreting Rule 408 to cover such evidence could lead to the exclu-
sion of evidence under Rule 408 that Congress intended to be admis-
sible according to the lines carefully drawn under Rule 410.
The Advisory Committee's note to the 1979 Amendment to Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 1 l(e)(6) (a provision identical to
Rule 410)128 made it clear that Rule 410 excluded evidence of a de-
fendant's plea discussions with a prosecutor but did not exclude evi-
dence of a defendant's discussions with law enforcement officials.
29
The Committee's differentiation between plea bargains and state-
ments made to law enforcement agents demonstrates its intent to ex-
126 See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302-03 (1973) (holding that applying
a state evidentiary rule to exclude reliable evidence of the defendant's innocence denied the
defendant due process under the Constitution). See generally EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED &
NORMAN M. GARLAND, EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE (3d ed. 2004) (providing a thorough discus-
sion of a defendant's constitutional right to present exculpatory evidence and the balancing test
courts employ to determine the scope of this right).
127 FED. R. EviD. 410.
128 Federal Rule of Evidence 410 was amended to contain identical language to Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 1 l(e)(6) as enacted in 1975. See FED. R. EvID. 410 advisory com-
mittee's notes. The 2002 amendments to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 deleted the
duplicative language and added a cross reference to Federal Rule of Evidence 410. See FED. R.
CRIM. P. 11 (f).
12 9 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee's note (noting that the amendment protects
plea negotiations made in proceedings authorized under Rule 11 "without attempting to deal
with confrontations between suspects and law enforcement agents.").
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clude evidence of the former to further the policy of plea bargaining
but not exclude evidence of the latter, as it "involve[s] problems of
quite different dimensions" unrelated to plea bargaining. 130 Accord-
ingly, while Rule 408 may exclude evidence of efforts to compromise
a criminal case, it should not exclude evidence offered against a
criminal defendant that Congress specifically intended to be admissi-
ble under Rule 4 10.131
United States v. Baker 32 provides an illustration of this point. In
Baker, the defendant attempted to use Rule 408 to exclude evidence
of statements he made to FBI agents about making a "deal.' 33 The
Advisory Committee's note to Rule 410 squarely addresses this type
of evidence of a discussion between a defendant and law enforcement
agent and clearly displays the Committee's intention that such evi-
dence be admissible under that rule. 134 Thus, the court in Baker
reached the proper result in admitting the evidence.1
35
Finally, altering the facts of Baker demonstrates the need for a
third limitation on the application of Rule 408 to bar evidence of
compromise efforts in criminal cases. Consider, if in Baker, instead of
the defendant making a statement offering to make a deal, the FBI
agents had initiated a compromise discussion with the defendant.
Then at trial, the defendant had attempted to introduce the statements
of the FBI agents as evidence in his favor. Rule 408 would not bar
such evidence when offered against the defendant because Congress
specifically intended Rule 410 to cover this situation,' 36 thus Rule 408
should not bar such evidence when offered against the government
and in favor of the accused.
In light of the public policy considerations behind Rules 408 and
410 and the inadequacies of Rule 403 to account for these policy con-
siderations, the interpretation of the relationship between Rules 408
and 410 set out above is a better interpretation of the rules than the
predominant view of the courts. This view is captured in Justice (then
Judge) Ginsburg's statement in Graham: "In the context of a criminal
case, Rule 410 (rather than Rule 408) strikes the balance between the
130Id.
131 See Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1957) ("Spe-
cific terms prevail over the general in the same or another statute which otherwise might be
controlling." (quoting Ginsberg & Sons v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932)).
132926 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1991).
133 Id. at 180.
134 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
135 Although it reached the correct result, the Baker court relied on reasoning that is incon-
sistent with the thesis of this Note and which has been rejected by the proposed amendment to
Rule 408. See infra notes 141-53 and accompanying text.
136See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
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interest in admitting all relevant evidence ... and the interest in re-
solving disputes without litigation."'137 Thus, the principal view is that
Rule 408 applies to compromise efforts of civil claims and Rule 410
applies to compromise efforts of criminal claims. While this interpre-
tation of the relationship between Rules 408 and 410 prevails in most
courts, it fails to properly weigh the public policy favoring plea nego-
tiations and their important role in our criminal justice system.
Therefore, there is a better interpretation of the relationship be-
tween Rules 408 and 410: Rule 410 strikes the balance between the
interest in admitting relevant evidence and the interest in resolving
disputes without litigation when evidence of plea offers or negotia-
tions are offered "against the defendant" in either a criminal or civil
proceeding (Boxes B1 and Dl), and Rule 408 strikes that balance
concerning all other evidence of negotiations or compromises, wheth-
er regarding a civil dispute or a criminal charge when offered against
a party other than the criminal defendant and whether such evidence
is offered in a civil or criminal proceeding (Boxes A, B2, C and D2).
This is the appropriate conceptual framework from which to view the
relationship between Rule 408 and Rule 410. This framework protects
the important policy goals underlying the rules and closes the gap left
open by Rule 410.
V. A RESPONSE TO COUNTERARGUMENTS
The previous section set out an argument in favor of utilizing
Rule 408 to bar admission of evidence of plea offers or statements
made during plea negotiations when offered by a defendant against
the government. While some commentators agree with this interpreta-
tion of Rule 408138 and at least one court has adopted this interpreta-
tion of Rule 408,139 other courts and commentators have pointed to
several flaws in this application of Rule 408. This section responds to
the primary counterarguments raised in opposition to the thesis of this
Note.
First, some courts and commentators assert Rule 408 does not ex-
clude evidence of efforts to compromise a criminal case because the
rule includes language that is not typically used in the criminal con-
text. The Second Circuit summarized the thrust of this criticism:
137 United States v. Graham, 91 F.3d 213, 219 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
138 See, e.g., MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 55, § 135, at 86, 90-91; ROTHSTEIN,
supra note 92, at 107-12.
139See United States v. Verdoorn, 528 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1976).
140 See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 55, § 134, at 81; WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra
note 9, § 5306, at 218.
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The reference to "a claim which was disputed as to either va-
lidity or amount" does not easily embrace an attempt to bar-
gain over criminal charges. Negotiations over immunity from
criminal charges or a plea bargain do not in ordinary parlance
constitute discussions of a "claim" over which there is a dis-
pute as to "validity" or "amount."
' 141
Indeed, the use of the word "claim," which Rule 408 centers around,
implies that Rule 408 applies only to civil compromises because, as
other commentators have noted, the Federal Rules of Evidence use
the word "charge"'142 in other rules to refer to a criminal context. 143 If
the drafters of Rule 408 had included the language "claim or charge"
instead of just "claim," there would be no doubt that Rule 408 could
be used in the manner proposed in this Note.
The fact that this result was not made explicit by the language of
the rule, however, does not mean that it is not a reasonable interpreta-
tion. The language at issue in the rule is offering or accepting "a valu-
able consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a
claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount .... "'44 The
language "validity or amount" is readily applicable to the criminal
context. Plea negotiations typically take place because a criminal de-
fendant disputes the validity of a criminal charge against him by
pleading not guilty, and the government will often offer a plea deal in
an attempt to reach a compromise solution to the dispute and avoid
the need for trial. Additionally, in cases where a defendant is charged
with larceny or fraud, plea negotiations often center on the amount of
monetary loss caused by the larceny or fraud that the defendant will
plead guilty to because the amount may potentially affect the sentence
imposed. 145 One commentator asserts that the language of Rule 408
includes compromises in the criminal context, noting, "[t]he criminal
context is within the policy of [Rule] 408, and in a real sense there is
141 United States v. Baker, 926 F.2d 179, 180 (2d Cir. 1991). Although the Second Circuit
made this statement in holding that Rule 408 does not bar evidence of civil compromises from
being introduced into subsequent criminal cases, the language quoted from the rule by the court
is used to define the type of compromises and not the type of cases (civil or criminal) to which
the rule applies. Thus, the statement properly summarizes the argument that the rule's language
does not cover criminal compromises.
142 See FED. R. EvID. 405(b).
113 2 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 171, at 466
(1985).
144 FED. R. EVID. 408.
145 See Blanche, supra note 112, at 544-45; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2B 1.1 (2004) (recommending the base offense level be increased when the loss from
theft exceeds $5,000).
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'consideration' on both sides of plea bargaining and a 'claim' (the
charge) whose 'validity' is disputed."1 46
As stated above, 14 7 the Second Circuit concluded that Rule 408 did
not apply in criminal cases, even to bar evidence of civil settlements,
because of the language of the rule. 148 The Sixth Circuit reached the
same conclusion, stating that the "plain language of Rule 408 makes
it inapplicable in the criminal context.' ' 149 With the proposed amend-
ment to Rule 408, however, the Advisory Committee has made it
clear that this conclusion is improper and not intended by the lan-
guage of the rule. Although the proposed amendment employs the
same language as the current rule, including reference to a "claim that
was disputed as to validity or amount," 150 the proposed amended rule
clearly applies in the criminal context in at least some circumstances,
contrary to the holdings of the Second and Sixth Circuits.15 ' Thus, the
conclusion by the Second and Sixth Circuits that the plain language of
Rule 408 is inapplicable to the criminal context is not a proper inter-
pretation of the language of the rule. Although Rule 408 does not
utilize language that is easily seen as covering compromises of crimi-
nal cases, the language does not prohibit that result. Therefore, the
rule may be reasonably interpreted as covering compromises in the
criminal context. 152
A second argument made by commentators against the interpreta-
tion of Rules 408 and 410 set forth in this Note is that, because Rule
410 specifically addresses the exclusion of evidence of plea bargains
and compromises in criminal cases, any such evidence not excluded
by the rule was intentionally not excluded; thus, Rule 408 should not
be used to supplement the exclusion of Rule 410.153 The authors of
14 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 92.
147 See supra Section I.A.
148 See United States v. Baker, 926 F.2d 179, 180 (2d Cir. 1991).
149 United States v. Logan, 250 F.3d 350, 367 (6th Cir. 2001).
150Proposed Amendment, supra note 15.
151 See FINAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 50, at 7.
152 One commentator's interpretation of the language of Rule 408 leads to a conclusion
contrary to this Note's thesis that Rule 408 may exclude evidence of plea negotiations. See
PAUL R. RICE & ROY A. KATRIEL, COMMON LAW AND FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 260
(5th ed. 2005) (noting that the language of Rule 408, which states that evidence of compromises
"is not admissible," when compared to the language of Rule 410, which states that evidence
concerning pleas is not admissible "in any civil or criminal proceeding," leads to the conclusion
that Rule 408 does not apply in any criminal proceeding). This position is severely undermined,
however, by the proposed amendment to Rule 408 that clearly indicates the intention that
Rule 408 apply to bar compromise evidence in at least some criminal proceedings. See FINAL
ADVISORY COMMrrTEE REPORT, supra note 50, at 7 ("[S]tatements made during compromise
negotiations of other disputed claims are not admissible in subsequent criminal litigation .... ").
153 See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 55, § 149, at 167; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 92
(citing Daniel J. Capra, Admissibility of Statements Made in Plea Negotiations, 211 N.Y.L.J. 3
(1994)); see also STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, FEDERAL
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one treatise argue that "since the exclusion of prosecutorial protection
from Rule 410 is so clear, it is difficult to imagine that the Advisory
Committee was unaware of this gap; thus it seems probable that it
was intentional." 154 Similarly, the District of Columbia Circuit Court
stated, "[i]n the context of a criminal case, Rule 410 (rather than
Rule 408) strikes the balance between the interest in admitting all
relevant evidence . . . and the interest in resolving disputes without
litigation."
' 155
The Advisory Committee notes to Rule 410 and Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 1 l(e)(6), however, do not support this conclusion.
The Advisory Committee note to the rule proposed in 1972 noted that
the rule's exclusion was limited to use against the accused, "since the
possibility of use for or against other persons will not impair the ef-
fectiveness of withdrawing pleas or the freedom of discussion which
the rule is designed to foster., 156 The use of the word "persons" in the
Committee's note shows that the Committee considered and rejected
broadening the exclusion of Rule 410 to protect other individuals
besides the criminal defendant engaged in the plea negotiations; it
does not, however, demonstrate that the Committee similarly consid-
ered or rejected any exclusionary rule protecting the government.
Moreover, the Advisory Committee note explained that "the pur-
pose of [the rule] is to not 'discourage defendants from being com-
pletely candid and open during plea negotiations.' '1 57 Considering
then that Rule 410 was drafted to protect the criminal defendant who
engages in plea bargaining, it is not surprising that the rule would
omit discussion of whether evidence of plea negotiations is admissi-
ble against the government or in favor of the criminal defendant.
Thus, Rule 410's omission of protection for the government does not
prevent Rule 408 from providing this protection.
Indeed, the rule's legislative history refutes the argument that the
omission of governmental protection from Rule 410 prevents use of
Rule 408 to provide this protection.1 58 The Committee note to the
RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 537 (6th ed. 1994) ("[I1f part of bargaining relates to criminal
charges, Rule 410 should govern. This ensures that all of the protection provided by Congress
will exist in practice, as well as in theory."). Additionally, a form of this argument was echoed
by the Courts of Appeals that held that Rule 408 does not apply in criminal cases at all. See,
e.g., Baker, 926 F.2d at 180 ("The very existence of Rule [410] strongly supports the conclusion
that Rule 408 applies only to civil matters.").
lu WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5306, at 218.
115 United States v. Graham, 91 F.3d 213, 219 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
156 FED. R. EVID. 410 advisory committee's note (emphasis added).
157 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee's note (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-247, at 7
(1975)).
158See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 92 (noting that the Advisory Committee's note to Rule 410
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1979 amendment to Rule I l(e)(6) expresses a clear intention that
Rule 410's limitation to evidence of plea negotiations offered "against
the defendant" does not preclude the application of Rule 408 to ex-
clude evidence of plea negotiations that are offered by the defendant
against the government.1 59 Noting that the rule's exclusion is limited
to evidence offered "against the defendant," the Committee note then
states: "[the rule] does not also provide that the described evidence is
inadmissible 'in favor of the defendant. This is not intended to sug-
gest, however, that such evidence will inevitably be admissible in the
defendant's favor. Specifically, no disapproval is intended of such
decisions as United States v. Verdoorn."
16
Thus, although Rule 410 leaves a gap in the protection of the plea
bargaining process by limiting its exclusion to evidence offered
"against the defendant,"' 61  the Advisory Committee note
demonstrates that this limitation of Rule 410 was not intended to
prevent the application of Rule 408 to close this gap of protection.
Had the drafters of Rule 410 intended to preclude this application of
Rule 408, they would not have cited approvingly the decision of
Verdoorn, which held that Rule 408 excluded evidence of plea
negotiations offered against the government by the defendant.
162
Consequently, rather than preventing the application of Rule 408 to
bar evidence of plea negotiations, the Committee note instead
indicates the Committee's approval of such an application of
Rule 408, as it furthers the policy behind Rule 410 of protecting and
facilitating plea negotiations.
VI. CONCLUSION
The proposed amendment to Rule 408 resolves the conflict
regarding the applicability of Rule 408 in criminal cases to bar
evidence of civil compromise efforts (Box C), but it leaves uncertain
the application of Rule 408 to attempted compromises during criminal
cases (Boxes B2 and D2). This may be because the issue does not
arise often or because courts often fail to consider the application of
Rule 408 when the situation arises. In any event, the proposed
amendment perpetuates the uncertainty regarding the application of
suggests no intention that Rule 410 precludes the application of Rule 408 in the context of
criminal compromise offers and statements).
159 See FED. R. CRIM. P. II advisory committee's note.
160 Id. (emphasis added).
161 FED. R. EvID. 410.
162 See United States v. Verdoorn, 528 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1976).
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Rule 408 to evidence of compromises of criminal cases and disputes.
This uncertainty could easily be clarified two different ways. If the
words "or charge" were added to the rule after "claim" in the phrase
"in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim," Rule 408
clearly would apply to evidence of compromise negotiations of
criminal charges. On the other hand, if the word "civil" was added
before "claim," Rule 408 clearly would not apply to evidence of
compromise negotiations of criminal charges. Until this uncertainty is
resolved by a specific change in the wording of the rule, it will remain
disputed whether Rule 408 applies to evidence of criminal
compromises.
This Note argues that Rule 408, in its current form, and under the
proposed amendment, may bar evidence of attempted compromises in
criminal cases that are not specifically addressed by Rule 410 (Box-
es B2 and D2).163 This application of the rule furthers the important
policy goals that Rules 408 and 410 protect-that of encouraging the
plea bargaining process and the settlement of disputes outside of a
formal trial. This will further protect government prosecutors engaged
in criminal plea bargaining by ensuring that criminal defendants can-
not use to their advantage the prosecutor's attempt to settle the case
quickly and without trial. Although it is not often that a criminal de-
fendant will break off plea negotiations and then attempt to introduce
evidence of such negotiations at trial, when this does occur, the ad-
mission of such evidence at trial could undermine the policy behind
Rules 408 and 410 and could have a chilling effect on the use of plea
negotiations. Therefore, the conceptual framework of Rule 408
should be viewed as covering all evidence of compromise negotia-
tions, regardless of whether the compromise is to resolve a civil or
criminal dispute, unless the evidence is specifically covered by
Rule 410.
MARK T. PAVKOVt
163 Editors' Note: An amendment to Rule 408 went into effect on December 1, 2006, im-
mediately prior to the publication of this Note. Therefore, references in the text to Rule 408
refer to the rule that was in force prior to December 1, 2006, and references to the "proposed
amendment" refer to the rule that is currently in force. Other than this grammatical difference,
the change in the rule does not affect the substantive discussion, premise, or thesis of this Note.
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